Mark McKillop

Archive for the ‘Commercial’ Category

Court Injuncts Sham PPSR Registrations

In Commercial, Security Enforcement on 23 May 2014 at 12:26 pm

Sandhurst Golf Estates Pty Ltd v Coppersmith Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 217

 

Initial registration of a financing statement on the PPSR is very easy.  You simply go to the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR) website and follow the links, enter the prescribed data, pay a small fee and hit a button or two.

The ease of registration, compared to a paper based registry such as land titles or the former company charges register, makes the PPSR more open to abuse.

In Sandhurst Golf Estates Pty Ltd v Coppersmith Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 217 three companies had financing statements registered in respect of their personal property without basis.  The registrations were maintained, in the face of demands to remove them, as leverage to pursue a claim one of the defendants had against Sandhurst and others.  The claim was not to a security interest in respect of personal property, but rather a claim to some equitable interest in certain land.  Accordingly, the claim was not registrable:  see paragraphs  [87] to [107] of the judgment of Robson J.

The financing statements following the administrative “show cause” process under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth).

That was not the end of the matter – in this case the defendants threatened to, and did, make more registrations to pursue their claim.  Each time a new financing  statement, or financing change statement, is registered, then the administrative process has to be repeated.  The administrative process is time consuming and expensive.  In the meantime, before it resolves, the existence of a record of sham financing statements can adversely affect the innocent party, especially with its own financiers and may amount to an event of default.

In Sandhurst the plaintiff companies successfully sought injunctions restraining further financing statements, or financing change statements, from being registered by the defendants.  The injunctions were obtained by the exercise of the Court’s inherent injunctive jurisdiction, rather than under any express power given to the Court by the PPSA:  see paragraphs [108] to [119].   The application is the first of its kind in Australia.

An application had also been made by the plaintiffs relying on s182 of the PPSA, but the Court did not need to deal with it.  However it is notable,and perhaps an unintended omission from the PPSA,  that the section does not contain an express power to enjoin registration of a financing statement, but does contain an express power to restrain the making of an amendment demand.

Further,  having established the absence of any security interest in the plaintiff companies’ personal property, the Court found that the substance of the defendants’ claims to an equitable interest to be irrelevant.  This meant that discovery in respect of those claims was not warranted, and that evidence and argument about those claims, except insofar as it was necessary to demonstrate the absence of a security interest, was not permitted.   The finding prevented the disocvery process in the application itself from being used in an abusive manner.   See paragraphs [120] to [121].

The author appeared as Counsel in the proceeding for the plaintiffs, instructed by Minter Ellison.  Nick Anson, Partner and Jane Salveson, Special Counsel have prepared an interesting alert regarding this case and particularly the problems arising out of Sham registrations, which can be found here.

Regards

Mark

As expected: Court finds against unregistered lessor in PPSA fight

In Commercial, Insolvency, Insolvency and Taxation on 9 July 2013 at 1:55 pm

The Supreme Court of NSW has decided a PPSA priority contest against the owner of leased Caterpillar equipment, in a fight with the receivers and managers of the equipment’s insolvent lessee.

The case is a warning to those used to ownership and title retention based forms of security.  The fact is that an owner/ lessor of equipment can lose its property to a secured creditor of a lessee upon VA or liquidation.

It also shows why it pays to get important agreements documented by a competent lawyer.

The case is Albarran and anor v Queensland Excavation Services Pty Limited & Ors [2013] NSWSC 852 (link).

The facts are available at the link in paras 1 to 10, which include at para 10 a useful statement of the issues and Brereton J’s conclusions on each of them.

Some of the more interesting facts are these:

  • the owner and lessor companies had a common shareholder, who appears to have informally financed the Caterpillar equipment and other vehicles from mainstream lenders;
  • the leases between the owner and lessor were not in writing, but were for more than one year.  There seems to have been an arrangement whereby the owner purchased the equipment on finance, and then passed possession on to the lessor in return for payment of the finance costs plus 10%;
  • the leases predated the transition to the PPSA;
  • that probably explains why the owner did not register its interest in the Caterpillars and why no written lease existed to make provision for the PPSA.

The decision is not unexpected given the circumstances:

  • the owner’s interest was a security interest in the Caterpillars – see s12(2)(i) and s12(3)(c) since the leases were PPS leases;
  • the equipment owner had failed to register its security interest, as owner;
  • lessor had executed a General Security Deed with its secured creditor which expressly gave security over the Caterpillars;
  • under s19(5) of the PPSA, leased equipment forms part of the lessor’s collateral capable of being subject of a security interest;
  • the secured creditor had registered the General Security Deed ;
  • the secured creditor prevailed because it had registered and the owner had not – s55(3).

See generally paragraphs 20 to 34 for the discussion of the nature of the security interests held by the owner and the secured creditor respectively in the Caterpillars. See generally paragraph 35 to 41 for the discussion of the priority contest.

The decision referred to many of the cases from other jurisdictions regarding priority at paragraphs 26 to 31.  The case that this reminds me of the most is Waller v New Zealand Bloodstock Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 629, discussed and approved at paragraph 30:  just switch the horse for an excavator.

There are some other interesting points in the decision:

  • An attempt to argue that the transitional provisions applied failed, because the Caterpillar equipment was registrable in the Northern Territoty (where the vehicles were used) on a local motor vehicles register – this triggered an exception to the transitional provisions which would otherwise have protected the position of the lessor as an owner with rights under the lease predating the registration date – see paras 47 to 56 in particular;
  • The rights to possession of the owner under the lease on default by the lessee company are lost once the VA or liquidation commences, so the owner cannot repossess – see s267.  In other words, no residual rights of true ownership survive because they vest in the company – see paragraph 72 ff.

There are some useful articles discussing the decision that I have seen so far, see:

  • Carrie Rome-Sievers at this link
  • Allens at this link

Regards

Mark

Tired of Christmas shopping? Queues may soon be a ghost of christmas past …

In Commercial on 18 December 2012 at 10:41 am

All

I have previously linked to the excellent series of monthly blog posts by James Stewart on issues in retail, usually focussing on insolvency articles.

After battling the crowds at Southland shopping centre on the weekend, James’ article on developments in the payments system gave me some hope things might improve for next year at least.  It seems your smart phone may soon replace the cash register.  Simply scan items as you collect them, put them in a bag in your trolley, pay at a smart terminal at the store exit and you are out of there.  No registers!

The article is at the following link.

Cheers

Mark

 

Tips for drafting longer, wider and more effective restraint of trade clauses – Pearson v HRX Holdings Pty Ltd (Full Court, FCA)

In Commercial on 22 August 2012 at 8:45 am

There is a well-known principle that a restraint of trade is prima facie void as contrary to public policy because it discourages competition and the restrained party from earning a living.  In considering whether a restraint of trade is void at common law, a Court will consider if as a threshold matter the restraint is no more extent than is reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the employer.  Usually the permitted period of restraint is fairly short and is of limited geographic extent.

Contrasting the usual situation, the Full Court of the Federal Court has recently upheld a 2 year restraint of trade clause against an executive and the co-founder of a consultancy business:  see Pearson v HRX Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 111.  The decision of the Court [link] demonstrates that if a restraint is carefully tailored by negotiation to the specific circumstances of the employer and employee, the parties bargain over the restraint’s key features and the reasoning for the duration and geographic reach is documented, and the employee receives independent advice, then restraints in excess of what might be considered the usual “rule of thumb” can be upheld.

The Facts

The appellant, Brett Pearson, was a “co-founder” of a human resources consultancy called HRX Holdings. He had established the business with Katrina Leslie in 2005.  Leslie was the effective controller of the company through shares held by her family trust.  Pearson had been a director and an employees of the business until his resignation in July 2011.  He left to join a competitor.

Pearson was the key employee of HRX:  it built the whole business around him.  He was at first the only employee.  By the time of his resignation, he was one of 130.  Pearson was a rainmaker.  The industry saw him as a leading innovator in the HR consulting field, was the primary presenter to clients and had an ability to establish and renew contacts with the senior executives of clients.  He also had full access to all of HRX’s confidential information, particularly its techniques for establishing and developing client relationships.

Pearson had negotiated an employment contract with HRX that was signed in December 2005, but was effective from February 2005.  The contract had been negotiated over a period of some months.  The restraint clause was a particularly heavily negotiated point:  both Pearson and Leslie had recognised that Pearson was the face of the business and the key person whom it was being built around.  Leslie gave evidence that the restraint of Pearson post termination was one of the biggest risks for the business to be managed.  Eventually they agreed that the restraint period would extend to two years (not 6 months as Pearson had first proposed).  Pearson obtained advice on all aspects of the contract from his own lawyers and accountants before he signed it.

The restraint clause is set out at paragraph [19] of the first instance judgment (HRX Holdings Pty Ltd v Pearson [2012] FCA 161) [link].  It included the following features relevant to the Full Court’s judgment:

  • a two-year restraint period;
  • no express geographic limit;
  • Pearson was to be restrained from (broadly speaking) participating in any way in what was defined as the “Restrained Business”, which meant “a business or operation similar to or competitive with the business of [HRX] …..at the time of leaving the company.”
  • Pearson was to be paid for the two-year period of the restraint (on conditions).

The Outcome

At first instance, the restraint clause was upheld.  Pearson appealed.  There were several issues of interest in the appeal.

First, whether the breadth of the restraint was such that it was contrary to public policy.  The Court upheld the decision at first instance that:

  1. The lack of a geographic restraint did not render the clause as a blanket restraint with worldwide operation.  Rather, it had to be read consistently with the purpose of the restraint, which was to  protect HRX’s business which was limited to Australia, New Zealand and other minor potential opportunities outside those markets, but was by no means global.
  2. The words “similar to or competitive with” had to be read together and construed consistently with the purpose of the restrain.  They did not prohibit activity in a “similar” but not “competing” business.  If the clause had been construed that way it would have been too wide.
  3. The limitation of the definition to businesses in which HRX was operating at the time of departure made the clause self-limiting, and less vulnerable to offending the rule against public policy.

Second, in applying the principle that the restraint would be permitted if it were reasonable, the Court took relied on the following matters:

  1. The restraint clause expressly acknowledged that Pearson was the key employee of the business and set out the reasons for that in some detail.
  2. Pearson had agreed to the definition of a Restrained Business without any negotiation.
  3. The extent of the negotiations of some months of the contract and over the period of restraint indicated a deliberate character to the execution of the contract including the restraint.
  4. The duration of the restraint was specifically negotiated.
  5. Pearson was to be paid during the restraint period.
  6. Pearson had sought and obtained independent legal and accounting advice.
  7. The parties expressly agreed that the restraints were reasonable.
  8. Pearson had been granted a free carry 8% shareholding, to be progressively released over the contract, as compensation for entry into the contract, and separately from his pay.
  9. Pearson and Leslie in combination had negotiated the contracts of various other HRX executives with similar (although shorter) restraints in them.

Pearson also argued that the restraint was unnecessary since confidentiality and non solicitation clauses operated post termination and that clause would protect HRX from exploitation of its confidential information by a new employer.  The Court quickly demised that argument.  Those clauses do not prevent the natural gravitation of clients, without solicitation, toward a key rain maker such as Pearson when he settles into a new role.

Conclusion

Although the case dealt with a very senior executive, it does have wider application.  It emphasises the benefit of an employer carefully reasoning the extent of the restraint so that it meets the employer’s needs and doesn’t exceed them, bargaining the clause with the employee, ensuring independent advice is taken or at least an opportunity to get it is available, using a fair a degree of documentation of that process and even recording the reasoning and bargaining process within the contract itself.  It also demonstrates that the external circumstances of the parties are very important, because the task of the Court is not limited to construction.  The Court’s role is also assessment of whether the restraint is reasonable having regard to public policy and to the purpose of protecting the employer’s interest that is key, which is an issue of fact.

Finally, the case has application beyond employment, to sale of business and other commercial agreements containing restraint clauses where similar issues arise.

Affordable Mediation in the Magistrates Court – the SLEM scheme

In Commercial on 15 July 2012 at 7:34 pm

One of the enduring problems with litigation in the Magistrates Court is that costs are high compared to the value of the case.  As a consequence the cost of private mediation can be prohibitive.

However, a major step to address the problem is a scheme instituted by the Court, known as the “SLEM” scheme, that can reduce the costs of a private mediator and venue to as little as $1,450.

Last week,  I attended a mediation under the “SLEM” scheme for the first time.

“SLEM” stands for Single List of External Mediators.  It is a list of mediators for civil matters in the Magistrates Court who are regarded as suitable as external mediators, in the alternative to a registrar or deputy registrar.  Each mediator on the SLEM has agreed to limit their fee to the fixed rate of $1,100, for at least three mediations a year, to encourage access to mediation in the Magistrates Court.

In addition, where the mediator is a member of the bar, the Victorian Bar mediation centre will provide rooms for a SLEM mediation at a cost of $350, as part of the scheme.

The mediation I attended was conducted very effectively by Carey Nichols, a barrister mediator who is a member of the SLEM list.  The matter settled.

For information on the scheme see the Magistrates Court website link.

Regards

Mark

Mediation part II – best and worst case scenarios if there is no deal

In Commercial on 28 May 2012 at 4:35 pm

Mark McKillop:

In my last post, space prevented an expansive discussion of the concepts of BATNA and WATNA (also known as BATNO and WATNO). These are concepts used in mediation to persuade parties to think of the financial consequences of not settling on the day. Literally, BATNA means “best alternative to not agreeing”, whilst WATNA means “worst alternative to not agreeing”. The idea is to work out the best and worst case scenarios for the client in financial terms if they don’t make a deal.

Of course the best case scenario should serve as a base line for an offer at settlement: rationally, a client should accept any offer meeting that figure since they cannot do any better by not agreeing and, say, continuing to litigate. They should also probably accept a deal that is worse than the BATNA since there is a risk that the outcome could be the WATNA, or something in between, if there is no agreement.

Paul Duggan has written an enlightening post on the issue (pun intended – you will see what I mean!) that I recommend to all readers.

Regards

Mark

Originally posted on Paul Duggan:

Mediation approaching? Care for a back-to-basics checklist beforehand? Then look at Mark McKillop’s recent blog “Ten Tips about Mediation” (link below).

But first let me top up Mark’s top ten with two extras – the twin concepts of ‘BATNO’ and ‘WATNO’.

In approximately 36 A.D. a notorious persecutor of Christians was travelling from Jerusalem to Damascus. Out of the blue (literally) he was knocked to the ground, blinded by a brilliant light and asked by a booming voice “Why do you persecute me so?” The traveller repented, recovered his sight and went on to a brief but spectacular career as St Paul, arguably the most famous convert, evangelist and martyr Christianity has ever produced.

How is this relevant to preparing for a mediation?

It absolutely isn’t. Damascus Road conversions never happen in mediations.

And yet it seems a rare mediation indeed that does not involve at least one party apparently banking…

View original 369 more words

Ten Tips about Mediation

In Commercial on 24 May 2012 at 10:58 pm

I have recently appeared at about half a dozen mediations for a liquidator regarding very similar preference claims over a period of two months.  It was interesting to see how some strategies employed by us and the other parties worked.  Some tips coming out of the process:

  1. When booking the mediation, be dubious when the other side wants a half day mediation.  It is extremely rare for a mediation to be done before lunch where the case has any significant value.
  2. Prepare a mediation position paper with the client’s input, even if one is not required or exchanged, for use as speaking notes for the open session.  Focus on just a few key issues that make a real difference to the outcome of the case and try to put the arguments about those issues in plain language that can be understood by the decision-making clients on the other side of the table.  There is nothing less effective than a dry recitation of the pleaded issues in legal language.
  3. If an opponent suggests that an open session can be skipped to save time, resist:  you will find that you have to tell the mediator about your position anyway and some of your message will be lost in the retelling.
  4. In the open session, without completely ignoring your opponent lawyer, you should mainly address the clients on the other side of the table.
  5. It is not unusual for round table discussions to become expansive.  Clients can feel the urge to say perhaps more than they ought to, particularly about issues of fact or their (mis)understanding of some legal point.  You can use these situations to your advantage by dealing with the point in issue when addressing those clients in the open session.
  6. Introducing new issues at a mediation can be a very effective way of putting a party off-balance.  But be prepared for the other side to discount the new issue on the grounds they have had no notice of it.
  7. Know the financial stakes if you don’t settle.  It surprised me that in a number of cases the defendant attended without calculating their exposure to costs and interest at the mediation date, or their potential liability at trial if they lost.
  8. Try not to let parties get away with claiming they do not have authority to go over a certain figure to settle:  it is usually nothing more than a brazen negotiating tactic.  You will usually hear this line at about 4:45 pm when the parties are losing steam.  It is easy to give ground, in order to achieve a deal on the day.  Don’t do it!
  9. Even if the attendees do not have proper authority as a matter of fact, the party is usually in breach of the terms of the mediation agreement by reason of it, and if the matter cannot settle the other party is well within their rights to threaten to abandon the mediation and seek indemnity costs of attending.  The appropriate response is to point those matters out, and tell the other side to get on the phone to get the necessary authority.
  10. Have terms of settlement drawn up in advance of the mediation and have a laptop handy on which they can be edited.  Time saving at least one hour, which could make the difference between getting out at a reasonable hour or not.

Regards

Mark

High Court decision gives broad reading of officeholders’ statutory duty of care and diligence

In Commercial on 3 May 2012 at 4:33 pm

The High Court delivered judgment today in ASIC’s regarding the directors of James Hardie Industries Ltd (JHIL) (link).  The Court also delivered judgment in a related appeal by the “General Counsel and Company Secretary” of JHIL at the time,  Peter Shafron, against ASIC (link).

These appeals involve the infamous separation by JHIL of certain asbestos making subsidiaries that had significant exposure to asbestos related diseases.  Readers may recall that JHIL represented at the time of the separation occurring that the subsidiaries had sufficient funding to cover future claims against them.  It turned out they did not, by a long shot.

ASIC pursued the directors and officers of JHIL for breaches of various statutory duties arising out of the transaction.  He was subject to various penalties as a result.

The decision regarding Peter Shafron is interesting because it illustrates the breadth of the statutory duties imposed on an “officer” as defined in section 9 of the Corporations Act (link).  The Court has made clear that it is the actual responsibilities of the office holder and their skill set in that field that define the area within which duties of care and diligence apply.

In brief terms, Shafron was found at trial and affirmed on appeal to have breached his duties under s180(1) (link) to JHIL as its “joint General Counsel and Company Secretary”.  Two breaches were the subject of the appeal.    The first breach was that he failed to give the board of JHIL advice that certain information in a deed involved in implementing the separation should have been disclosed to the ASX.  Second, he failed to advise the board that cash flow modelling used to estimate JHIL’s exposure did not take into account superimposed inflation of the cost of meeting medical claims (being medical costs inflation over and above the general level of price inflation), and accordingly was not an adequate guide to the required level of provisions.

Shafron argued that his alleged contraventions could not give rise to a breach of s180(1) because they arose from work he did in his capacity as General Counsel, and not in his capacity as a statutory officer.  He argued that he could only be liable for a breach of his statutory responsibilities as company secretary, which he argued were generally administrative and did not involve providing legal advice.  He argued that whatever duties he had as in the role of General Counsel were not within the statutory responsibilities of a company secretary.

The High Court disposed of this argument swiftly by means of the construction of s180(1).  The Court held that on any reading of s180(1)(b), the duties of care and diligence on the office holder are in respect not only of the statutory responsibilities of the office, but also in respect of whatever responsibilities that particular office holder has been given or has assumed within the corporation.   The High Court’s analysis is at paragraphs [18] to [20] of the judgment.  In particular at para [19] the Court held:

…..The effect of par (b) of s 180(1) is to require analysis of what a “reasonable person” in the same position as the officer in question would do. His or her position is not adequately described unless regard is had both to the office held and to the responsibilities that the person has. Further, Mr Shafron’s submissions ignored the evident difficulty in defining, for the purposes of limiting the conduct considered, the content of “the office held” where a person is an officer by virtue of par (b)(i), (ii) or (iii) of the definition of “officer” in s 9. A construction which avoids that difficulty, and avoids a more limited operation of s 180(1) in relation to some officers than in relation to others, is to be preferred.

In this case, Mr Shafron’s responsibilities were found by both the primary judge and the Court of Appeal to have included the tendering of relevant advice (including legal advice) about disclosure requirements. As the Court of Appeal rightly said:

“A company secretary with legal background would be expected to raise issues such as potential misleading statements (in relation to the draft ASX announcement) and disclosure obligations (in relation to the DOCI) with the board. Ordinarily it might not be the same with respect to a matter such as the JHIL cash flow modelling, which required particular expertise. But Mr Shafron had a quite close involvement with the cash flow modelling, and raising the limitations of the cash flow model [based on the material Mr Shafron had obtained from Trowbridge] is by no means a legal matter for the attention of general counsel; the involvement, and raising the limitations, in our view fell within Mr Shafron’s responsibilities as company secretary.” (emphasis added)

That is, Mr Shafron’s “responsibilities within the corporation” extended to the several subjects identified. Once it was found that his responsibilities extended to those subjects, the question became whether Mr Shafron undertook those responsibilities with the requisite degree of care and diligence.

Regards

Mark

More online troubles for traditional retail: landlords beware

In Commercial, Insolvency on 26 March 2012 at 11:01 am

I wrote a post a month or so ago about the effect of online sales on the retail property sector (link).

One of the sources for the post was James Stewart’s Retail Postcard column.

James has just released another very interesting post (link), arising partly out of his recent appointment as receiver of the WOW SIght and Sound chain in Queensland (similar to JB Hi Fi but not as successful).  The current post is not up yet but you can subscribe at that page and get it now by email.

It deals with the trouble electronics retailers are having here and in the US.

The most interesting part of the post to me was this:

Best Buy, the undisputed market leader in the USA (FY11 sales USD50b, 180,000 staff worldwide), is now the subject of considerable speculation about its future despite remaining a profitable business (FY11 net earnings USD1.1b). In fact since January 2011, Best Buy’s share price has lost over 31% of its value and the business now trades at a meagre 2.8 times earnings, making it one of the five worst-performing retail stocks in Standard & Poor’s 500 Index last year.

And recently, I was appointed Receiver and Manager over WOW Sight and Sound, the $260m Queensland-based consumer electronics retailer which just found the going too tough.

So what is the problem?

The answer is simple: Best Buy has become Amazon’s showroom.

(emphasis added)

Last week I heard the same complaint by a Chapel Street small retailer selling fashion footwear:  people are coming in to try his stock for size, and then buying on the net.

To make matters worse, the manufacturers led by Apple are opening their own direct to market chains:

On top of this, the days of brand manufacturers needing retailers as their only channel to market are coming to an end.

Ten years ago, Apple did not have a retail store at all. Now it is the best specialist retailer in the world. Google, Sony, Samsung are all heading down a similar path.

While brands are increasingly becoming successful vertically integrated retailers, traditional retailers are struggling to remain great brands, particularly when they sell other people’s products.

There is no better example than Apple.

While independent consumer electronics retailers may say that Apple is great for business (because it drives foot traffic), they know that the margins they achieve on Apple products can be terrible (as low as 5%) and ultimately you cannot build a sustainable old school retail business on Apple products alone. The short answer is that Apple doesn’t need traditional retailers the way they need Apple!

So what does this mean for retailers and retail landlords?  My guess is not happy days:

  1. Retail electronics will continue to struggle and the retail space taken by them will come under price pressure;
  2. Any product that can be sold over the internet and shipped is going to suffer the same sort of pressures.  As an example, the well known bike store CBD Cycles in Melbourne has said it is being hammered by internet bike sales (including whole bikes!) from overseas.
  3. Direct to market branded stores will become more common – but will most probably require less space.

Regards

Mark

Liquidator’s or Receiver’s lien may be at risk under PPSA in some circumstances

In Commercial, Insolvency, Personal Liability of Insolvency Practioners on 14 March 2012 at 5:34 pm

Most commentators, relying on s73 (link) of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009, state that liens are not affected under the PPSA.  Section 73 provides priority to liens and other security interests arising under general law or under statute (called “priority interests”) in some circumstances.

But there are some serious traps for creditors relying on liens under the new regime.

First, if a creditor is relying on a contractual lien to get paid,  that creditor is going to lose out in a priority battle with a secured party holding a security agreement in respect of all assets.  Section 73(1)(a) only provides for protection to an interest arising under general law or under statute, but not a lien arising by agreement.  A lien created by a contract is a security agreement that under the PPSA will require perfection (by registration or otherwise).

So where a logistical services company claimed a lien under its terms of trade over goods in its possession belonging to a customer, they lost out to a receiver appointed over the customer by a bank with a prior registered all assets security agreement:  see McKay v Toll Logistics (NZ) Limited (HC) [2010] 3 NZLR 700 (link); Toll Logistics (NZ) Limited v McKay (CA) [2011] NZCA 188 (link).  There is a good summary of McKay by Leigh Adams at (link).

Second, even if a creditor has a lien under statute or general law, it should be careful before taking a concurrent contractual lien.  It might be argued by a secured party holding a prior registered security agreement that section 73(1) doesn’t apply, because the contractual lien supplants the general law or statutory lien that would otherwise have arisen.  A solution for the lienee would be to ensure that the contractual lien on its terms specifically preserves any general law or statutory liens that may arise, and be created in addition to those liens.

Third, a liquidator or receiver who relies on a “salvage lien” arising under the principles in Re Universal Distributing Co Limited (in Liquidation) (1933) 48 CLR 171 should be careful to check that their lien is protected under s73(1).  It is possible that the terms of a prior registered security agreement could purport to prohibit the grantor “creating” a salvage lien.

A salvage lien does arise under general law, however it could be expected that a receiver or liquidator may well have actual knowledge of the terms of a prior registered security agreement held by a financier.

By s73(1)(e) a lien holder who has actual knowledge that creation of a subsequent priority interest will breach the terms of a secuity agreement does not receive protection of the section.   Further, the section only governs liens arising “in the ordinary course of business” – see s73(1)(b).

Now for many possessory liens arising in the ordinary course of business, the lien holder will be unaffected.  Think classically of a repairer.  A motor vehicle repairer engaged to fix a company vehicle might expect it to be under finance, but would not be likely to check the PPSR and obtain a copy of any prior security interests.

But for a salvage lien, the situation is more difficult.  A liquidator or receiver may well know the terms of a prior ranking secuirty agreement.  There could also be a tricky argument about whether a salvage lien arises “in relation to providing goods and services in the ordinary course of business”.  In my view it probably does not, given that it will arise only once the grantor is insolvent and continuing to trade under the control of an insolvency practitioner.  Until we know the answer by a decided case, the risk remains.

I note the same risk may confront solicitors and accountants holding a lien over a file for unpaid fees, for the same reasons.

These are potentially troubling results.   If one is in a position of having actual knowledge of prior security interests, then before relying on a lien of any complexion, care must be taken to avoid loss of priority to a registered security agreement.

Thanks to Nick Anson of Minter Ellison for comments on this post (link to Nick’s profile).

Regards

Mark

Bankruptcy Notices can be served by email

In Bankruptcy, Commercial, Insolvency on 7 March 2012 at 9:00 am

One of the first posts on this blog dealt with establishing service of documents by email, tweet or facebook message (link).

Now, service of a bankruptcy notice by email has been held to be effective.  The relevant case is The Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Archer (Federal Magistrates Court, Lloyd-Jones FM, 13 February 2012)(link).

It is surprising that an individual can be served with a bankruptcy notice by email, given that the recipient who fails to comply with the notice commits an act of bankruptcy.

The decision arises out of regulation 16.01(e) of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (link) which permits a document to be “sent by facsimile transmission or another mode of electronic transmission”.  The Court surveyed the authorities and found none that permitted service by email.  Instead the Court relied on earlier authorities dealing with facsimile transmission.

The Court dealt with a number of issues raised by email service:

  1. The requirement that the document be left “at the last known address of the debtor” imposed by r16.01(c) could be met when the address being used was an email address, and it did not matter that use of the email address was not tied to any fixed physical location as a street address or fax machine location might be;
  2. If the email “bounced back” then service would not be effective;
  3. Evidence on behalf of the debtor to the effect that he or she did not receive the document does not negate service, in the absence of the document being returned undelivered or other evidence of non-delivery:  being the same rule that applies to service by post.  Evidence of “non receipt” is not relevant;
  4. The email account need not belong to the debtor provided there is evidence that the debtor checks the account.  In the Archer decision, the account belonged to the debtor’s spouse and was checked about once a week by the debtor.

The decision is consistent with Austin J’s judgment in Austar Finance Group Pty Ltd v Campbell which is referred to in my earlier post, and it will be interesting to see if superior courts follow the Archer decision.

Regards

Mark

What effect are online sales having on retail property?

In Commercial, Insolvency on 6 February 2012 at 7:29 pm

Another question that I pondered over fish and chips at the beach these holidays was the impact of online sales on demand for bricks and mortar retail space.  I am a confessed online shopping addict.  With developments like Myer stores projected downsizing and mass closure of Dick Smith Electronics outlets, the outlook for the property sector doesn’t look great.

I received an excellent update (link) on the impact of online retail on the demand for property in the retail sector from James Stewart of Ferrier Hodgson a few weeks ago.  James writes a monthly series of updates (link) which are well worth reading for those of you interested in the retail sector and insolvency issues in that sector.

The update made three interesting points:

  1. the space requirements of retailers will fall, through a combination of greater online sales reducing in store sales, and a deliberate strategy by retailers to downsize stores and offer a greater convenience experience (think Apple stores).
  2. Australia is behind the curve – whilst traditional bricks and mortar American retailers are generating up to 18% of their sales online and growing, in Australia the figures are more like 1%;
  3. as the trend toward multichannel sales takes hold in Australia, landlords will face less demand for retail space and downward pressure on rents.  Almost all landlords will be at risk from this development, although “destination” and best in class properties (Chadstone, Bondi, Chermside) will be insulated.

On a similar note, see a recent post by my colleague Sam Hopper (link) on the impact such developments might be expected to have on rent negotiations and valuations.

Regards

Mark

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